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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the cyclicality and the relationship between government 
expenditure and output of Indonesia, 1999-2012 using Johansen co-integration 
test and the error correction model. The results confirm that in the short-run the 
government expenditure reveals counter-cyclical but pro-cyclical in the long-
run. Output and government expenditure are co-integrated and it implies the 
existence of long-term relationship. The value of short-run elasticity coefficient 
for government expenditure is relatively high. In contrast, the long-run elastici-
ty coefficient is lower and statistically greater than unity confirming the voraci-
ty hypothesis. Furthermore, there is no significant difference of government 
spending in good and bad times.  
 
Abstrak 
Makalah ini menganalisis siklus dan hubungan antara pengeluaran pemerintah 
dan output Indonesia selama 1999-2012 dengan menggunakan teknik uji ko-
integrasi Johansen dan model koreksi kesalahan. Hasil empiris mengkonfirma-
sikan bahwa dalam jangka pendek pengeluaran pemerintah menunjukkan 
adanya counter-cyclical, tetapi dalam jangka panjang terhdap pro-cyclical. Va-
riabel output dan belanja pemerintah terkointegrasi sehingga menyiratkan 
adanya hubungan jangka panjang antara keduanya. Nilai koefisien elastisitas 
jangka pendek untuk pengeluaran pemerintah relatif tinggi. Sebaliknya, koefi-
sien elastisitas jangka panjang lebih rendah dan secara statistik lebih besar dari-
pada kesatuan yang mengkonfirmasi voracity hypothesis. Selain itu, tidak ada 
perbedaan yang signifikan dari pengeluaran pemerintah baik pada situasi yang 
baik maupun buruk. 
 
Introduction 
In the last decade, the importance of gov-
ernment expenditure has received much at-
tention of academicians and policy makers 
(see for example: IMF, 2008). Government 
expenditure and factors of their growth are a 
serious problem of many countries. The 
main question is whether government 
spending (broadly speaking fiscal policy) is 
really effective to stabilize macroeconomic 
condition in particular during global finan-
cial crisis in the late of 2008.  
For academicians, the controversy 
arises between Keynesian and Classical 
schools of thought. Keynesian thought tra-
ditionally, on one hand, emphasizes on an 
active role in fiscal policy for economic 
stability throughout aggregate demand 
management. On the other hand, Classical 
economists have negative views of fiscal 
stabilizing policy regarding the Ricardian 
equivalence or even crowding out effect 
(Romer, 2012). 
For policy makers, fiscal policy is 
less popular compared to monetary policy 
to control economic fluctuations. Besides 
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the longer policy lags than monetary poli-
cies, the failure of fiscal policies in Latin 
America during the 1980s and Japan during 
the 1990s gave a negative experience to 
authorities for controlling business cycles 
by fiscal policies. Moreover, the govern-
ment failure to intervene economy is often 
far stronger and more harmful than poten-
tial market failure (Gingrich, 2007).  
However, the ineffective monetary 
policy particularly in the case of the zero 
lower bound on nominal interest rate in re-
cent years has encouraged policy makers to 
rely on fiscal policy (Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Rebelo, 2011) through fiscal 
stimulus packages. Hence, the central issue 
is then how optimal fiscal policy should be 
conducted. While fiscal policy in industrial 
countries is either a-cyclical or counter-
cyclical, fiscal policy in developing coun-
tries is, by and large, pro-cyclical. 
Knowing cyclicality of the size of 
fiscal multipliers is important for govern-
ments. In its most basic form, the fiscal 
multiplier corresponds to the change in 
output for a change in a fiscal policy in-
strument such as government spending, 
transfers or taxes (Chinn, 2012). Basically, 
if fiscal multipliers are high, fiscal policy 
has large effects on the real economy; it 
means that expansionary spending is an 
efficient way to boost the economy. Never-
theless, Galí (1994) and Fatás and Mihov 
(2007) warned that countries aggressively 
implementing pro-cyclical fiscal policy will 
have less desirable volatility and lead to 
lower economic growth. Similarly, Rother 
(2004) argued that fiscal discretion affects 
de-stabilization rather than the stability of 
the macro economy. 
The existence of trade-off between 
growth and stabilization pushed govern-
ments to reevaluate the effectiveness of 
their fiscal policy. As the economy grows, 
the economic policies of governments 
should have a tendency to more heavily 
focus on economic stabilization rather than 
economic growth. In fact, the advanced 
economies have a priority of economic sta-
bilization over economic growth. Con-
versely, the emerging economies tend to 
emphasize to economic growth relative to 
stabilization. With regard to its cyclicality, 
can fiscal policy (more specifically gov-
ernment expenditure) effectively offer a 
better precondition to achieve them simul-
taneously in the long-run? 
Indonesia provides a unique oppor-
tunity to assess the nature of government 
spending cyclicality. Asian financial crisis 
in 1997/98—with all consequences—
directed government expenditures to focus 
on the economic recovery. Then, the global 
financial crisis in 2008, pushed the gov-
ernment to attempt to revive economic ac-
tivity through various fiscal stimulus meas-
ures. After that, gradually Indonesia in 
2010s is one of the largest developing 
countries to implement various economic 
liberalization reforms that produce strong 
economic growth (Hur, et al., 2010; Abdu-
rahman, 2013). Therefore, lessons from 
Indonesia will be useful to develop a better 
stabilization or adjustment policy design 
for developing countries. 
This paper enriches the literature on 
fiscal policy in the context of economic 
stabilization in developing countries with 
focus on Indonesia. The motivation for this 
approach associates to the fact that the size 
of government is relatively small so the 
scope for actively promoting economic 
growth remains limited. Moreover, based 
on the past experiences of external shocks, 
Indonesia consistently conducts some pru-
dent macroeconomic policies to prevent 
their negative impacts in the short and me-
dium terms so it would be suboptimal to 
cut back government expenditure to make 
more room for domestic instability. There-
fore, implementing pro-growth, pro-job, 
and pro-poor fiscal measures is likely to 
require an increase in the size of the gov-
ernment spending. 
The article is organized as follows. 
In the next section, we briefly present the 
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literature and previous empirical researches 
both in developed countries and developing 
countries including Indonesia. The third 
section describes the dataset and empirical 
techniques used. Then, we present the re-
sults of government expenditure cyclicality 
and long-run and short-run relationship be-
tween output and government expenditure. 
In the end, we conclude with a summary of 
key findings. 
Economic performance is greatly 
influenced by the level and the structure of 
government expenditure. The development 
of government expenditure lays both in the 
political and economic tracks. In the politi-
cal context, it is often associated with vo-
racity effect. Voracity effect occurs if a 
positive shock to income leads to a more 
than proportional increase in public ex-
penditure even if the shock is expected to 
be temporary. The voracity is usually attri-
buted to weak institutions and ethnic frac-
tionalization, manifested in the presence of 
multiple interest groups seeking to secure a 
greater share of national wealth by de-
manding larger public expenditure on their 
behalf (Akitoby, et al., 2006). 
In the economics literature, the de-
velopment of government expenditure 
could be traced back to Wagner´s law. 
Wagner's law states that government activi-
ty increases as economies grow. As coun-
tries become more developed, the demand 
for public goods raises and is consistent 
with the increasing ability to collect the ne-
cessary funds. It implies that the elasticity 
of government expenditure compared to 
GDP is greater than one. It seems that both 
Wagner's law and voracity effect support to 
the notion of passive role of government 
expenditure. 
The Keynesian view, in contrast, 
proposes the role of discretionary fiscal 
policy to boost aggregate demand and sup-
port growth. The public expenditure should 
act as a stabilizing force implying that, 
ideally, the government expenditure should 
increase during the recession, to induce the 
aggregate demand. On the other hand, it 
should be reduced during the economic 
booms. Hence, the Keynesian perspective 
suggests an active fiscal policy and relies 
on the size of government expenditure mul-
tiplier in smoothing the impact of shocks. 
There are several methods to esti-
mate the government expenditure multip-
lier including recursive approach (Fatás and 
Mihov, 2003; Galí et al., 2007), structural 
vector auto-regressions/VAR (Blanchard 
and Perotti, 2002), narrative approaches 
(Ramey and Shapiro, 1998), sign restriction 
(Mountford and Uhlig, 2009), DSGE model 
simulations (Kamps and Caldara, 2006; 
Coenen, et al., 2012), and case studies 
(Romer and Romer, 2008; Ramey, 2011). 
In fact, they have different strengths and 
weaknesses in addressing the challenge of 
methodological issues. 
The first issue is how large exactly 
the government expenditure multiplier. As 
stated by Hemming et al. (2002), the simu-
lation results of some of the macroeconom-
ic models in developed countries showed 
positive short-term multipliers of fiscal pol-
icy ranging from 0.1 to 3.1. Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) have estimated government 
spending multipliers using VAR. They 
found that a positive shock on government 
spending (deficit increased by a flat tax) 
has a positive effect on output, although its 
effects tend to weak. Hall (2009) and Ra-
mey (2011) synthesized this large and ra-
pidly-growing literature for the US and 
suggest that one-year government spending 
multipliers are somewhere between 0.5 and 
1.5.  
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2012) 
assembled quarterly fiscal and national ac-
counts data for a sample 27 emerging mar-
kets and used VAR-based identification 
schemes to estimate a one-year government 
spending multiplier equal to about 0.3. 
Kraay (2012a, 2012b) develops an identifi-
cation strategy based on the fact that there 
are substantial lags between the approval 
and implementation of aid-financed devel-
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opment projects. Isolating a component of 
fluctuations attributed to aid project ap-
proval decisions from previous years, they 
provide evidence suggesting that the gov-
ernment spending multiplier is somewhere 
between 0.4 and 0.5 on average, in a large 
sample of developing countries. 
Along with the wide range of fiscal 
multiplier, the second issue is that the fiscal 
multipliers are not constant, but vary with 
country characteristics, the stance of mone-
tary policy, and the state of the business 
cycle. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2012a) documented that this is the case 
empirically in the US and in a sample of 
OECD economies. Among developing 
countries, both Ilzezki, Mendoza, and Végh 
(2012) and Kraay (2012b) also provide 
evidence suggesting that multipliers are 
larger during recessions.  
The third issue deals with its cycli-
cality. This interest was triggered by a 
work of Gavin and Perotti (1997) which 
found that fiscal policy is highly pro-
cyclical in Latin American countries. This 
finding was in contrast with the previous 
studies by Galí (1994) and by Fiorito and 
Kollintzas (1994), and Fiorito (1997), 
which found that for developed countries 
expenditures were either counter-cyclical 
or a-cyclical. It therefore followed that cyc-
licality of fiscal policy differed significant-
ly between developed and less developed 
countries.  
Various hypotheses have been put 
forward by economists to explain variations 
in fiscal cyclicality between advanced and 
developing economies. As per those hypo-
theses, the differential in the cyclicality in 
fiscal policy between advanced and devel-
oping economies arises from: (i) restric-
tions on access to domestic (Caballero and 
Khrishnamurthy, 2004) and/or international 
credit markets (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; 
Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008); (ii) 
institutions or political structures (Alesina 
et al., 2008; Thornton, 2008; Talvi and 
Végh, 2005); and (iii) the polarization of 
preferences associated with social inequali-
ty (Woo, 2009). 
The fourth problem is endogeneity. 
The analysis of fiscal policy cyclicality 
proposes that the behavior of government 
spending is in response to output fluctua-
tion. The output is not purely exogenous 
variable but it also is influenced by fiscal 
policy. The failure to address this problem 
causes simultaneity bias and consequently 
the cyclicality of fiscal policy could be mis-
leading (see for example: Spilimbergo, 
Schindler, and Symansky, 2009). Some au-
thors then used several strategies to handle 
it including instrumental variable, lagged 
output, auto-regression, some additional 
control variables, GMM (General Moment 
of Method), and two stages least square 
methods in order to allow for feedback ef-
fects.  
Afonso, Agnello, and Furceri 
(2010) elaborated some issues above using 
integrative approach. They decomposed 
fiscal policy into three components: res-
ponsiveness, persistence, and discretion. 
The responsiveness of the fiscal policy can 
be considered as the stabilization theory. 
The fiscal persistence and discretion can be 
interpreted as the behavior of the govern-
ment. For them, fiscal persistence can be 
considered as a measure of the degree of 
dependence of current fiscal behavior on its 
own past developments. Using a sample of 
132 countries, their results point out that 
fiscal policy tends to be more persistent 
than to respond to output conditions.  
In reality, evidence of pro-cyclicality 
in fiscal policy has been covered in a num-
ber of studies (see for example: Lane, 2003). 
Unfortunately, there has been no general 
consensus so far within and across countries. 
Regardless some methodological issues 
identified above, it seems, however, that 
counter-cyclicality in developed countries 
and pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in devel-
oping countries have become the received 
wisdom (Kaminsky, Reinhardt, and Végh, 
2004). 
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In the case of Indonesia, the empiri-
cal studies on the related topic are limited. 
Simorangkir and Adamanti (2010), for ex-
ample, assessed the effectiveness of fiscal 
stimulus in accordance with the global fi-
nancial crisis. Using financial computable 
general equilibrium approach, they found 
that relative to the effectiveness of fiscal 
expansion without monetary policy expan-
sion or monetary expansion without fiscal 
expansion, the combination of those two 
policies is more effective. Therefore, the 
combination of fiscal and monetary expan-
sion has a large multiplier effect, boosting 
aggregate demand. 
Basri and Rahardja (2011) found 
that unanticipated shocks in central govern-
ment spending had a little negative effect on 
real GDP. By using VAR models, they also 
found that impact multipliers for unantici-
pated tax shocks to real GDP are higher than 
that of unanticipated shocks in government 
spending. In the same spirit, Hur, et al. 
(2010) found the similar results. The fiscal 
stimulus programs have contributed substan-
tially to developing Asia’s countries (includ-
ing Indonesia) faster and stronger than ex-
pected recovery from the global financial 
crisis.  
Regarding to the cyclicality of fiscal 
policy, Akitoby et al. (2004) and Baldacci 
(2009) had not found any counter-
cyclicality in fiscal policy, i.e. the Indone-
sian fiscal policy tends to be more a-
cyclical or even pro-cyclical. Abdurohman 
(2013) investigated the practical behavior 
of fiscal policy in Indonesia in response to 
economic cycles to establish whether it fol-
lows general fiscal wisdom or amplifies the 
cycle. He showed that fiscal policy in In-
donesia tends to be pro-cyclical.  
Jha, et al. (2010) found the absence 
of cyclicality of fiscal policy in the case of 
developing Asian countries including Indo-
nesia. Overall, their panel empirical results 
lend limited support to the popular belief 
that counter-cyclical fiscal policy boosted 
aggregate demand and output. However, in 
the longer perspective, Surjaningsih, et al. 
(2012) concluded that government spend-
ing is more effective to stimulate economic 
growth especially in times of recession, 
compared to taxation policies.  
 
Methods 
Most studies analyzing the cyclicality of 
government expenditure and output in de-
veloped and developing countries have used 
a yearly panel data methodology that has not 
fully exploited the time-series properties of 
the data. On the other hand, studies testing 
for a long-run relationship, such as Wagner's 
law, ignored the short-term aspects of this 
relationship. In the literature on cyclicality, 
many studies use panel data models that are 
not well suited to explore short-term versus 
long-term relationships. 
This paper also would be to provide 
an overview of issues regarding the cycli-
cality of government spending in the con-
text of developing countries. We contribute 
to the literature in several ways. Firstly, we 
conduct the analysis at the single country-
level instead of large number of countries 
and a wide time-frame. This is because 
some of the conventional wisdoms on the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy are based on ag-
gregate (global) data even though policy 
makers are typically concerned with the 
behavior of business cycle at their own 
country level.  
Secondly, we analyze the behavior 
of cyclicality of government expenditure in 
relation to business cycle referring to actual 
output gap instead of potential output gap 
(i.e. output is below its potential). General-
ly, many researchers (Lane, 2003; Fatás 
and Mihov, 2007; among others) used Ho-
drick-Prescott (HP) filter procedure to es-
timate the potential output. The potential 
output gap is then calculated by differenc-
ing between the actual output and the HP-
filtered output.  
The motivation for our approach re-
lates to the fact that measuring potential 
output in developing countries including 
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Indonesia is difficult. The major reason for 
this is most likely due to the limited availa-
bility of reliable, long, and high frequency 
data quality. As a consequence, it is not easy 
to discuss business cycles or cyclicality per 
se. Therefore, we alternatively employ ac-
tual output gap (i.e. output in the current pe-
riod is below its previous period by assum-
ing that output in the previous period is the 
potential one). Accordingly, we focus on co -
movements of government expenditure and 
output as a proxy for cyclicality. 
As was already noted, fiscal policy 
is a possible automatic stabilizer. The most 
important fiscal policy lever in the hands of 
the Indonesian government is government 
consumption. It would be worthwhile to see 
how change in government consumption 
impacts the final output in the economy. 
Following methodology used by Akitoby et 
al. (2006), we suppose there is a steady-
state (or long-run path) relationship be-
tween government expenditure and output 
given by:  
G = A Y
δ
  (1) 
G represents government expendi-
ture and Y means output. Equation (1) can 
also be written in linear form: 
Log G = Log A + δ Log Y + µ (2) 
If the adjustment of expenditure G 
to its steady-state G* is gradual, then the 
level of expenditure will respond to transi-
tory changes in output, and G will move 
gradually toward its steady-state, or equili-
brium level. To capture this gradual move, 
we specify a general autoregressive distri-
buted lag specification in period t: 
Log G
t
 = a + α Log G
t-1
 + β
1
 Log Y
t
 + β
2
 
Log Y
t-1
 + ε
t
;  α<1 (3) 
We can solve for the static, steady-
state equilibrium by assuming that output is 
at its steady-state level Y* and ignoring the 
error term: 
Log G* = a/(1-α) + (β
1
+β
2
)/(1-α) Log 
Y*;  δ =1 - α  (4) 
More generally, we could allow 
output to grow at rate g. In this case, the 
only difference is that the constant term 
becomes [a+(β
1
-δ)g]/[1-α], which depends 
on g. To reflect the steady state, (3) can be 
rearranged as the error correction model: 
Log G
t
 = a + β
1
 Log Y
t
 + γ (Log G
t-1
 - δ 
Log Y
t-1
) + ε
t
 (5) 
In (5), we can interpret β
1
 as the 
short- run elasticity of government expendi-
ture with respect to output. It also 
represents the cyclicality of government 
expenditure in response to business cycle.  
The error correction term [γ (Log 
G
t-1
 - δ Log Y
t-1
)] captures deviations from 
the steady state, or long-run equilibrium, 
where  is the long-run elasticity of gov-
ernment expenditure with respect to output, 
and γ is the rate at which government ex-
penditure adjusts to past disequilibrium. 
Term ‘a’ is constant of the model and ε
t
 
means residual component of long-term 
relationship. 
Moreover, (5) can be rewritten as 
(6) and then used to test if there is a long-
run relationship between government ex-
penditure and output. In particular, follow-
ing (2), if γ is significantly different from 
zero in (6), then output and government 
expenditure are co-integrated. 
Log G
t
 = a + β
1
 Log Y
t
 + γ Log G
t-1
 - ϕ Log 
Y
t-1
 + ε
t
 (6) 
where ϕ = γ. According to Engle 
and Granger (1987), (6) can be also re-
parameterized as follows:  
 Log G
t
 = a + β
1
  Log Y
t
 - γ 
ECT
t-1
 + ε
t
 (7) 
where ECT is µ as in (2). 
 
The above derivation makes clear 
the underlying assumption that there is an 
elasticity relationship between output and 
expenditure, while the transitory deviations 
are random. In cases where  is insignifi-
cant, there is no steady-state relationship 
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between fiscal variable and output, and β
1
 
is best estimated by omitting the error-
correction term such that: 
 Log G
t
 = a + β
1
  Log Y
t
 + ε
t
 (8) 
Equation (8) is the base-line regres-
sion. It will be further extended by splitting 
 Log Y
t
 into positive actual output gap ( 
Log Y
t
 +) as well as negative actual output 
gap ( Log Y
t
 −). This is done to identify 
asymmetric response of government ex-
penditure to good and bad periods: 
 Log G
t
 = a + 
1
 ( Log Y
t
 +) + 
2
 ( Log 
Y
t
 −) + ε
t
 (9) 
In relation to economic stabilization 
goal, we expect that the coefficient of 
2
 is 
positive and statistically lower than the 
negative value of 
1
.  
Since we concern with cyclicality, 
we need reliable and long span time series 
data on government expenditure and GDP. 
The GDP data are available in quarter ba-
sis. Unfortunately, the quarterly data of 
government budget are publicly unavaila-
ble. Data on monthly cash disbursement of 
functional government budget has never 
been released by Ministry of Finance to the 
public. In addition, the quality of interpo-
lated annual data into quarterly data that 
was used by some researchers is quite ques-
tionable. Regarding to the limitation, we 
analyzed quarterly data on government ex-
penditure derived from the national income 
standard account based on expenditure ap-
proach. This is intended that our study will 
be comparable to similar studies in other 
countries. 
The sample periods chosen for this 
study extend from 1999(1) to 2012(4). The 
total observation is 56 sample points. The 
term government expenditure used in this 
study is central government general con-
sumption or recurrent expenditure realiza-
tion (mostly allocated onto wage/salary and 
goods/services purchase) excluding interest 
payment of government debts. The recurrent 
expenditure dominates (almost 90 percent) 
to the capital expenditure of the total gov-
ernment spending. Therefore, the earlier is 
representative for analyzing fiscal policy. 
The general government spending and out-
put are presented in 2000 constant price. All 
of the data are taken from the central bank 
of Indonesia (www.bi.go.id). Most of the 
results are calculated in econometric pro-
gram Eviews 8.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Government expenditure helps overcoming 
the inefficiencies of the market system in 
the allocation of economic resources. It al-
so helps smoothing out cyclical fluctuations 
in the economy and influences a level of 
employment and price stability. Thus, gov-
ernment expenditure plays a crucial role in 
the economic growth of a country. Figure 1 
presents the two variables of interest, the 
rate of change of output and the rate of 
change of public expenditures.  
The trend of output growth dropped 
significantly in 1997/98 corresponding to 
the subsequent impact of Asian financial 
crisis. In line with economic recovery pro-
grams, the annual output growth was very 
low but still positive. Coincidently, the 
huge government expenditure increased 
due to food and energy subsidies in order to 
secure the lower-layer income receiver 
households. In the proceeding four years 
the growth rates of government spending 
and output fluctuated and hence there was a 
little synchronized pattern along with eco-
nomic reformation programs. In contrast, 
since 2002 there was a large similarity be-
tween the two rates of growth in the oppo-
site direction.  
When we divide the sample period 
into pre- and post-global financial crisis, 
the conclusion does not substantially 
change. In the pre-period of global finan-
cial crisis (starting from 2008(3)), the cor-
relation coefficients are -0.42 and -0.31 re-
spectively. The statistical evaluation above 
confirms the weak co-movement between 
output and expenditure growth rates. This, 
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of course, creates a negative correlation in 
the long-run. As Figure 1 shows, the long-
run correlation between output growth and 
expenditures growth is moderate and might 
dominate the short-run correlation. We 
therefore need to control for this long-run 
correlation in order to derive a more accu-
rate estimate of cyclicality of fiscal policy. 
 
Figure 1: Growth Rates of Output and 
Government Expenditure 
 
In the proceeding section, we focus 
on the time series properties of each series. 
Many studies point out that using non-
stationary macroeconomic variable in time 
series analysis causes superiority problems. It 
is well known in literature that applying re-
gression on a set of non-stationary series is 
likely to produce a spurious estimation. Thus, 
a unit roots test should precede any empirical 
study employing such variables. We decided 
to make the decision on the existence of a 
unit roots through Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test and Phillip-Perron (PP) tests. 
The test is conducted 4 times for the 
level and first difference data respectively. 
The results of ADF and PP tests are reported 
in Table 1. The tests confirm the stationary 
of all-time series on the first difference. 
Both tests are concluded that all the va-
riables are non-stationary in their level. 
Hence, the ADF and PP tests were applied 
to the transformed series of each variable to 
check for the possibility of stationary in first 
differences. In the first difference forms, all 
the variables are become stationary. 
Testing the stationary is the essen-
tial assumption for implementation of co-
integration approach. Co-integration is an 
important concept to analyze the long-run 
behavior of the data. It is necessary to con-
firm that time series are non-stationary at 
level data but stationary at first difference. 
Using Johansen’s maximum likelihood ap-
proach (Johansen, 1988; 1991), we test the 
bi-variate between the two variables. The 
trace statistics together with maximum ei-
gen value ( max) for testing the rank of 
co-integration are shown in Table 2. 
The null hypotheses of non-stationary 
can be rejected at 5 percent or even 1 percent 
significance level. It implies that the series 
data have a unit roots and does not demon-
strate the existence of a common trend in 
those series. It also implies that the behavior 
of the variables varies around to the mean 
value and invariant overtime (Enders, 2004). 
The occurrence of unit roots in the series 
gives a preliminary indication of shocks hav-
ing permanent or long lasting effect, thus 
making it very difficult for traditional stabili-
zation policies to survive. 
Furthermore, both tests suggest the 
presence of two co-integrating equations at 
5 percent level or even 1 percent signific-
ance level between the non-stationary (or 
stationary at the different levels) series 
which means that the linear combinations 
of them are stationary and, consequently, 
those series tend to move towards the equi-
librium relationship in the long-run.  
 
Table 1: Unit Roots Test 
Variable to be 
Tested 
Level First Difference 
ADF PP ADF PP 
Log (G) -1.421622 -3.211597* -3.998373* -40.28619* 
Log (Y) 2.190905 1.620373 -3.257697* - 22.83643* 
(*) denotes significant at 1 percent level 
-.8
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-.2
.0
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Table 2: Co-integration Test 
 Series: Log (G) Log (Y)  
Hypothesized  Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Eigen value Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None ** 0.6803 70.1209 18.17 23.46 
At most 1 ** 0.1463 8.5444 3.74 6.40 
 * (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) level 
 Trace test indicates 2 co-integrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels 
 
Table 3: Estimation Results 
Model 
Dep. Var: (Log (G)) (A) (B) (C) (D) 
(E) 
Dep. Var: Log (G) 
C 0.0652 
(0.0592) 
2.5379 
(0.0091) 
5.4858 
(0.0000) 
0.0525 
(0.0036) 
C -9.3075 
(0.0000) 
(Log (Y)) -3.4926 
(0.0078) 
-3.3391 
(0.0075) 
- -2.7995 
(0.0001) 
Log (Y) -2.8039 
(0.0001) 
(Log (Y))+ - - 0.8514 
(0.8985) 
- Log (G(-
1)) 
-0.2396 
(0.0000) 
(Log (Y))− - - -18.1262 
(0.0311) 
- Log (Y(-
1)) 
4.5163 
(0.0216) 
Log (G(-1)) - -0.2371 
(0.0109) 
-0.5380 
(0.0000) 
- - 
ECT(-1) - - - -1.2421 
(0.0000) 
- 
DGFC - - 0.2824 
(0.0008) 
- - 
R
2
 0.1260 0.2295 0.4068 0.7781 0.8856 
R
2
-adj 0.1095 0.1998 0.3594 0.7695 0.8789 
SEE 0.2206 0.2091 0.1871 0.1122 0.1129 
F 7.6399 7.7423 8.5725 91.1488 131.6038 
DW 2.7953 2.3861 2.0373 1.7059 1.7200 
Figures in parentheses are p-value 
The diagnostic tests can be obtained from the author on request 
 
Table 3 reports the OLS estimation 
results of five models specified in the pre-
vious section. We start with the simplest 
model connecting directly the growth rates 
of government spending and output (Model 
A). Surprisingly, the corresponding coeffi-
cient is negative, -3.49, and statistically 
significant. It suggests that the government 
decreases 3.49 percent as a response of 1 
percent increase in output growth. Unfortu-
nately, this result suffers some econometric 
problems, i.e. normality of residuals and 
serial correlation. 
Estimation of the model with lag of 
dependent variable, as is actually done by 
Afonso, Agnello, and Furceri (2010) to 
avoid endogeneity, offers a better and con-
sistent result. Model B yields a lower coef-
ficient, -3.34. The problems of normality of 
residuals and serial correlation are not ex-
perienced anymore. This means that ac-
cording to this test government expenditure 
in Indonesia is moderately counter-cyclical. 
As proposed by Afonso, Agnello, 
and Furceri (2010), fiscal persistence can 
be considered as a measure of the degree of 
dependence of current fiscal behavior on its 
own past developments. The coefficient of 
persistence is 0.24 implying that only 24 
percent partial adjustment to respond to the 
desired expenditure. Consequently, the 
government spending tends to be less per-
sistent than to respond to output conditions.  
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Modifying their model by splitting 
into positive and negative output growth 
rates provides the same conclusion of coun-
ter-cyclicality. Model (C) offers that the 
short- run coefficient of elasticity with re-
spect to positive growth shocks is 0.85; sta-
tistically insignificant. On the other hand, 
the short-run elasticity coefficient of nega-
tive output growth shocks is much higher 
than the original model, -18.13. It seems 
that government expenditure tends to in-
crease faster in the recession periods. It 
suggests that stabilization—instead of eco-
nomic growth—has already become the 
primary objective in Indonesian economic 
development. 
This finding confirms to Ilzezki, 
Mendoza, and Végh (2012) and Kraay 
(2012b) which provide evidence suggesting 
that multipliers are larger during recessions 
among developing countries. It implies that 
in the economic downturns the government 
remains inducing her expenditure in the 
higher rate of growth relying on foreign 
and domestic government debts as a conse-
quence of decrease in tax revenues. Hence, 
we infer that promoting government ex-
penditure is effective even in the short-run 
to stimulate aggregate demand as Surja-
ningsih et al. (2012) pointed out. It also 
suggests that fiscal policy is responsibly 
also directed to perform economic stabili-
zation through coordination with monetary 
policy especially in the downswing periods. 
The asymmetric test to identify 
whether the characteristics of responsive-
ness indicated that government spending is 
typically the same between in good times 
and bad times. Implementing analysis of 
variance (F) and goodness of fit (χ2) tests 
performs that the null hypothesis could be 
accepted in 95 percent confidence level. 
Given that, we can say that the government 
expenditure decreases (increases) at the 
same growth rates in response to macroe-
conomic circumstances either in upward or 
downward growths. As a result, this finding 
does agree with Basri and Rahardja (2012) 
that tax cut also remains being effective to 
stimulate short-term economic growth par-
ticularly in the recession periods.  
 The counter-cyclicality of govern-
ment spending during recessions is sup-
ported by significance of global financial 
crisis dummy (DGFC). The coefficient of 
DGFC is positive and statistically signifi-
cant suggesting that there are substantial 
differences characteristics of the govern-
ment expenditure. To minimize the adverse 
economic impacts of global financial crisis, 
the central government launched fiscal sti-
muli amounting 73.3 trillion Rupiah allo-
cated mostly to social welfare. Meanwhile, 
in the Asian financial crisis periods, hun-
dreds trillion Rupiah were directed to re-
structure the financial intermediations.  
Compared to the previous studies, 
the evidence of short-run elasticity of gov-
ernment expenditure with respect to output 
is relatively higher. We next show that the 
specific dynamics of Indonesian economic 
growth and fiscal policy during this period 
tend to bias this estimate upward signifi-
cantly. Model (D) presents the results of 
error correction model to capture the short-
run dynamics without loosing the long-run 
information. 
Model (D) delivers the Engle-
Granger (1987) error correction model 
which produces the lower short-run elas-
tici ty coefficient, -2.80 compared to the 
yield of models (A) and (C). It seems that 
the dynamic model is systematically better 
to explain the behavior of government ex-
penditure indicated by higher coefficient of 
determination (R
2
 = 0.78) and lower stan-
dard error of estimate (SEE = 0.11). In ad-
dition, this model technically also passes 
most of the diagnostic tests. 
 However, the coefficient of ECT 
unexpectedly is statistically higher than un-
ity (-1.24). The adjustment coefficient indi-
cates dynamic instability. If the associated 
coefficient is less than 1, it represents the 
stable rate at which government expendi-
ture adjusts to past disequilibrium. It seems 
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that Engle-Granger error correction model 
is unsuccessful to explain the dynamics of 
adjustment in the case of Indonesia. Hence, 
we move on to the estimation of unrestric-
tive error correction model (equation 6) as 
reported in model E.  
Even though we cannot compare 
them (regarding R
2
 and SEE) due to the 
difference of dependent variable, the short-
run coefficient of government expenditure 
with respect to output fluctuation (β
1
) is -
2.80; quite similar with model D. Again, 
the adjustment coefficient (γ) is almost the 
same with the result of model (C) − -0.24 − 
which the earlier merely takes into account 
the lag of dependent variable. The adjust-
ment in the model E considers not only the 
lag of dependent variable but also the lag of 
independent variable. The later is also used 
by many authors (see: Lane, 2003) to avoid 
endogeneity problem. 
As model (D), model (E) also pro-
duces a significant ECT with similar ad-
justment coefficient. We can conclude that 
there is a co-integrating relationship be-
tween government expenditure and national 
output as found from Johansen test. The 
implication of a significant ECT is in fact 
that there is a long-term relationship be-
tween government spending and real GDP 
which is consistent with Wagner's law. But 
it is suitable to point out that the existence 
of co-integration does not imply causality, 
which is consistent with Wagner's view that 
there is not necessarily a cause and effect 
relationship between the two variables of 
interest. 
Overall, the five models above con-
firm to each other that is the existence of 
short- term counter-cyclicality of govern-
ment expenditure. The counter-cyclical pat-
tern of government expenditure behavior in 
Indonesia could be probably related to the 
absence of discretionary fiscal policy made 
by the government of Indonesia as found in 
Surjaningsih et al. (2012). The State Budg-
et deficit of Indonesia during last four dec-
ades was relatively manageable at below 3 
percent level of GDP implying the absence 
of discretionary fiscal policy either in ex-
penditure or revenue sides. 
Discretionary fiscal policy is de-
fined as a change or a reaction to fiscal pol-
icy that does not reflect a reaction to the 
current economic conditions (Fatás and 
Mihov, 2003). Fiscal policy theoretically is 
categorized into three groups: (1) automatic 
stabilizers; (2) discretionary fiscal policy as 
a response to economic conditions, and (3) 
discretionary policy conducted for reasons 
other than the current macroeconomic con-
ditions. Empirically, there are many ways 
to measure discretionary fiscal policy. Ac-
cording to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), 
components of ECT or µ in (2) and ε
t
 in 
equation (6) are a quantitative estimate of 
the discretionary policy shock in govern-
ment spending. Our study confirms to both 
studies. Our ADF and PP tests proved that 
both ECT and ε
t
 are stationary suggesting 
there is no discretionary spending policy.  
Refer to Talvi and Végh (2005) and 
Alesina et al. (2008), the absence of discre-
tionary spending policy cyclicality could be 
attributed to financial resource constraints 
and institutional problems. In the case of 
Indonesia, they are represented particularly 
by the weak budget executions timing, 
which often internally indicated by the high 
gap between the planned budget and its rea-
lization (actual budget). As stated by Abdu-
rohman (2013), a weak capacity to execute 
the budget undermines the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy to manage aggregate demand. 
Arguably, the large gap between what is 
planned and its realization also reflects a 
weak budget financing capacity (Baldacci, 
2009). As a result, as shown by Figure 1, 
the low increase in government expenditure 
occurs in the first quarter of fiscal year 
coincidently when the output growth is get-
ting upturn. In contrast, the high increase in 
budget execution of government expendi-
ture takes places heavily in the fourth quar-
ter of each year at the time when the output 
growth tends seasonally to decline. 
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Table 4: Long-Run Coefficient and Voracity Tests 
Coefficient Short-Run Long-Run 
Long-Run Voracity Test 
Model (E) 
a -9.3075 -7.5082 Test Statistic Value Prob. 
β
1
 
-2.8039 1.3813 F 42.0036 0.0000 
γ -0.2396 - χ2 42.0036 0.0000 
ϕ 4.5163 - Conclusion Ho (Long-Run β
1
 = 1) not accepted 
Source: Table 3 
 
So far, we have discussed the cycli-
cality and the relationship between gov-
ernment expenditure and output in the 
short- run perspective. Table 4 summarizes 
the results about the long-run elasticity of 
expenditure with respect to output which 
are derived from Table 3. It could be calcu-
lated by dividing the short-run elasticity by 
the corresponding coefficient of adjustment 
in the absolute form. Since the unrestricted 
error correction model provides better re-
sults, we refer them to further analysis. 
The long-run elasticity coefficient is 
positive (1.3813) and much higher than that 
in the short-run. A positive value of the 
elasticity is consistent with a wider inter-
pretation of Wagner's law, as it implies that 
government expenditure rises with national 
income. If the elasticity is higher than one 
then this would be consistent with a narrow 
interpretation of Wagner's law, where gov-
ernment expenditure rises faster than na-
tional income. 
The statistical evaluation confirms 
to the narrow interpretation of Wagner's 
law. Implementing again F and χ2 conven-
tional tests convincingly (p-value is quite 
low) proved that the null hypotheses cannot 
be accepted. Hence, the coefficient value 
statistically exceed one is consistent with 
the voracity hypothesis, as it suggests that 
in response to a given shock to real GDP, 
government expenditure rises by even more 
in percentage points. Since the characteris-
tic of government expenditure responsive-
ness is typically equal, this evidently ap-
plies both in the case of positive and nega-
tive output growths. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to provide direct 
empirical evidence on cyclicality and the 
short- term and long-term relationship be-
tween government expenditure and output 
in Indonesia over the period of 1999–2012. 
We analyzed quarterly data on government 
expenditure according to national income 
and product account based on expenditure 
approach standard.  
The motivation behind this paper is 
although the theory and empirics imply that 
government expenditure is counter-
cyclical, our research does prove that in the 
short- run. In the long-run, the results con-
firm pro-cyclical development of govern-
ment expenditure on real GDP, Wagner’s 
law, and voracity effect. To the best our 
knowledge, this study is the first that found 
the counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy in 
the case of Indonesia. 
We used Johansen co-integration 
test and the error correction models. Be-
cause unrestrictive error correction model 
provided a better result, our main conclu-
sion is based on it. The empirical study af-
firms that output and government expendi-
ture are co-integrated and it implies a long-
term relationship between government ex-
penditure and output. The government ex-
penditure is moderately counter-cyclical 
and robust in all of the specified models. 
The value of long-run elasticity coefficients 
is higher than unity. This is consistent with 
the interpretation of Wagner's law and indi-
cates that the public sector is increasing in 
relative importance. As a result, the voraci-
ty hypothesis exists particularly in the long-
term. Meanwhile, the fiscal responsiveness 
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is indifferent either in the upward or 
downward output conditions. 
Those findings provide some im-
portant economic implications. Firstly, they 
suggest that political and institutional fac-
tors are the main obstacle in the short-run 
for government to effectively play an im-
portant role to the economy. Secondly, the 
prudent fiscal policy management in the 
long-term is necessary to avoid possible 
crowding out effect induced by voracity 
hypothesis existence. Thirdly, as a conse-
quence, discretionary government expendi-
ture should be given widely as preliminary 
stage to reach sustainable counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy frame works toward effective 
macroeconomic stabilization. Further stu-
dies are advisable to break down the gov-
ernment expenditure to re-check the possi-
ble counter-cyclicality in the long-run. 
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